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Abstract—Location based queries are increasingly common
in mobile applications, and the associated privacy issues have
become a hot research topic in the last years. Most of the
current approaches, however, do not account for the location of
potentially sensitive places and for constraints on the movement
of users, such as speed limits or network contraints.
In this demo we present different deployment scenarios of
a privacy-preserving framework for the protection of sensitive
positions in real time trajectories. We assume that the sensitivity
of users’ positions depends on the spatial context, while the users’
movement is confined to road networks and places. Further, the
users are non-anonymous, as in the case of geo-social network
members who agree to share their exact position whenever it
does not fall within a sensitive place, e.g. a hospital.
We will show that our proposal is suitable for different classes
of devices and can be integrated in different kind of location
based applications.
I. MOTIVATION
A large number of mobile applications are based on the
collection of user’s positions, usually up to a precision that
is far greater than the one required to satisfy the user’s
needs. Those positions, once disclosed, could be stored for an
indefinite time and represent a potential threat to the privacy of
the users, specially if combined to other kind of data that allow
to make unwanted inferences on the activities of the users at
some given time in the past or about the belonging of the
users to some social group. An example of such contextual
data are the position and use of buildings in the city [1],
[2]. For instance, repeated visits to healthcare facilities could
reveal information on the user’s health state, whereas visits to
religious buildings may be a clue on her religious belief.
It is worth noticing that most existing approaches to the
preservation of privacy in LBS (Location Based Services) do
not directly tackle this kind of privacy threat. Instead they
try to solve it indirectly, with no guarantees, by cloaking the
user’s position in a way that is not dependent on what we
are interested in hiding. Unfortunately this could result in
an excessive loss of position accuracy, or at the opposite in
an inadequate protection, as in the case of an enlarged user
position that is entirely contained into a sensitive location such
as a hospital. The SAWL framework for privacy protection
addresses this issue by accounting for both the position of
sensitive sites in the territory and the statistical distribution
of the user population, in order to ensure that in case a
generalized user position is made public, and it contains some
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Fig. 1. Device classes and their peculiarities
sensitive location, it will not be possible to assess that the user
was likely inside the sensitive part of the disclosed region.
Supposing that the user movements are tied to a road
network and constrained by speed limits some additional
privacy threats raise, since those constraints could be used
by others to restrict the user position to a much more precise
location than the user would expect. For this reason, a more
recent work [3] extends the contribution presented in [4] to
address the same problem on a road network connecting places
characterized by a typical population and a feature type, that
the user may use to specify what is sensitive to her and to
what extent.
In this demo we will discuss different alternatives for the
deployment of the cloaking mechanism on mobile devices to
achieve a usable and efficient solution. We will focus on both
the different device capabilities and on the user point of view,
to show how it is possible to protect the privacy of the user
and to increase her privacy awareness without affecting the
user experience in the use of a location based application.
To emphasize the perception of the actual complexity of the
system hidden by a friendly and transparent user interface, we
will show in parallel what is happening in the system and what
the user is seeing while using a privacy preserving location
based application, such as a simple closest restaurant finder.
II. CLOAKING
In [3], the user is supposed to move along a road network
that connect places. These places are characterized by popu-
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Fig. 2. Low-end devices: server side map generation and position cloaking
larity values, in such a way that it is possible, given that a
user is contained in one of the places from a set, to determine
for each of the places the probability of finding the user in it.
Instead of disclosing their exact position, users protect
their privacy by disclosing a part of the road network (and
associated places) that contains their actual position. In doing
so, they ensure that once a cloaked position is disclosed, it will
not be possible to determine whether they were in a sensitive
place with a probability higher than a threshold specified on a
place type basis. A privacy profile is the set of those constraints
indicated for each place type.
Further, the proposed methods deal with privacy threats
based on velocity constraints, named velocity attacks. In
those situations untrusted third parties could determine, by
exploiting velocity constraints, that part of the cloaked region
declared by the user is not reachable in the elapsed time. Thus
they could restrict the actual user’s position to a smaller region
with respect to the one that satisfies the privacy profile.
In [3] two kinds of cloaking modes are described: offline
cloaking and online cloaking. In this work we will focus
on the first one, in which all the cloaked regions are pre-
computed. At run time, online service requests are checked
for privacy breaches (against the velocity attacks). If there are
no privacy breaches, the respective cloaked region is disclosed
to the LBS provider, otherwise a transformation is needed. We
consider two kinds of transformations: time delay, in which the
request is postponed in time domain, and postdating, in which
a previously private position is disclosed instead of the current
one.
The time delay mode introduces temporal error while the
postdating mode introduces spatial error, both measured using
temporal metrics. Unless the time delay is not greater than the
acceptable time delay threshold, we prefer time delay over
space error. Otherwise, we apply postdating.
III. ARCHITECTURES
Mobile devices are quite heterogeneous with respect to their
computational resources, chiefly CPU, RAM, and flash mem-
ory. Consequently, in the design of our system we accounted
for the existence of different classes ranging from the cheapest
smartphone to the more expensive tablet PC and notebooks.
For each kind of device the available resources influence
the autonomy degree of the client, forcing a migration of the
more computational challenging parts to a trusted third party
Fig. 3. Mid-level devices: server side map generation, client side position
cloaking
Fig. 4. high-end devices: client side map generation and position cloaking
server aware of our exact position or at least of our privacy
profile.
According to this analysis we identified three different
classes of smart terminals:
• [Server side] Low-end devices with limited memory: the
client is not able either to generate a cloaked map by
itself, or to store it. Thus, it is forced to rely on a position
cloaking service (PCS) to cloak its position.
Figure 2 visually shows the interaction of the client with
the PCS and with the LSB. Before each access to an
untrusted LBS application the client sends its current
position to the PCS to obtain a position that can be safely
disclosed. The trusted PCS computes the cloaking of the
client position in such a way that the constraints detailed
in the user’s privacy profile are satisfied and sends it back
to the client. Then the client can use it to access the
untrusted LBS.
The privacy profile can be cached by the PCS, as well as
the partial results used for the cloaking, to simplify the
answer to subsequent enquiries.
• [Hybrid] Mid-level devices having a large storage: the
client is not able to generate a cloaked map by itself, due
to its limited RAM and slow CPU. However it has enough
secondary storage, for example on microSD card, to store
a cloaked map for later use in autonomous cloaking.
Since the client is not able to generate the map, it relies
on a map cloaking server (MCS) to perform this task and
retains the map as long as it can be reused.
Figure 3 depicts the interaction of the client with the
MCS and with the LSB. When the client enters a new
337
Fig. 5. Profile selection
zone, it sends a bounding box for the region of interest
and a privacy profile to the MCS that returns a cloaked
map (collection of subgraphs). This map is stored by the
client and accessed before each access to an untrusted
LBS application to obtain a position that can be safely
disclosed.
When the client move out of the current map, or when this
is likely to happen in the near future, a new cloaked map
is requested. The old one is cached for a possible future
reuse, and is managed according to a cache replacement
policy to limit the overall memory usage.
• [Client Side] High-end devices having large memory,
large storage, and fast CPU. The device is completely
autonomous: it fetches the road network and the position
of the places in the city as well as their feature types
from a service like OpenStreetMap. These data are then
used to compute cloaked maps and cloaked positions.
Figure 4 illustrates the behaviour of the client in this
scenario. When the client enters a new zone, it sends
a bounding box for the region of interest to a feature
repository (OpenStreetMap) that returns the road network
and the features that are located in that zone. The client
use these data, together with the privacy profile, to
generate a cloaked map that will be accessed before each
LBS access to cloak the current user position before its
disclosure.
Also in this case, new data will be fetched and new maps
generated depending on the movement of the client.
IV. DEMO STORY LINE
In this demo we will show different possible deployment
scenario for SAWLnet. During the demonstration we will
cover the whole life cycle of the interaction between the
mobile devices, the location based service providers, the
privacy enforcement provider, and the geodata provider.
A. Building the datasets
The first step for the configuration of a running system,
independently of the specific device class scenario, is the
creation of an annotated city network based on the roads and
Fig. 6. Map of sensitive locations at two different levels of detail
buildings obtained from a geodata provider, in our case Open-
StreetMap1. After selecting the area of interest the raw data are
processed to obtain the annotated city network according to
our definition. This process could be done on the fly whenever
data for a new region are needed, either on the mobile device
or by the privacy enforcement provider depending on the class
of device in use. However, it is worth noticing that it is a
one time only operation whose result is identical for all users,
since it uniquely depends on the selected area, thus it does
make sense to cache results for future reuse. Since the result
is identical for all users, it is not sensitive. Thus, from a privacy
point of view, it is indifferent to perform this operation directly
on the device or in some external server, provided that we
trust it will not intentionally corrupt the data we are going to
retrieve (the same holds for the geo-data provider).
To demonstrate this step, we will show how to obtain the
dataset presented in [3], based on the OpenStreetMap’s Milano
Street Map.
B. Profile selection
The privacy profile is based on the user’s perceptions of
her own privacy, in particular on which kind of association to
semantic locations she deems harmful and to which extent. In
the application we will show in the demo, the user is able to
either select one of the predefined privacy profiles or to define
a new one, by using the graphical user interface in Figure 5.
A selection of sensitive location type determine the identifi-
cation of a set of sensitive places in the city. Figure 6 shows a
map of the center of the city of Milan (Italy) at two different
level of detail with the sensitive locations marked in blue.
During the demo we will highlight the effects of different
privacy settings on the quality of service and on the protection
1http://www.openstreetmap.org/
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Fig. 7. Cloaked map at two different levels of detail
Fig. 8. History of our past positions
from velocity and location semantic based attacks, both in
a qualitative way and by means of summary statistics on
spatio-temporal error and position accuracy collected during
the usage.
C. Walking the city
After these two preliminary steps we will start the core part
of the demo, focused on the behaviour of the system as the
users move in the city and use some LBS service to share their
position with closeby friends and to find the nearest restaurants
and shops. For the sake of the demo, we will fake the user
position to simulate the movement across the city.
To give a better insight on the internals, during this part of
the demo we will use a composite user interface with a part
taking care of the user movement and actions, a part showing
the cloaked map with highlighted current and past positions,
and a part showing the emulated device interface.
The movement emulation interface allows to select the
position of the user, either directly or by replaying recorded
trajectories. In the second case, also past actions such as LBS
requests can be replayed. As the user moves and performs
actions, the application specific interface is visible in the
device emulator. In the case of the restaurant finder, for
instance, we will see our current exact position, the cloaked
position that will be disclosed, and visual alerts of delay
or postdate due to velocity attack avoidance. Finally a web
interface show what is happening server-side: the position
tracked by the LBS provider (Figure 8), the maps generated
by the Map Cloaking Server, and the statistics about cloaking
and transmitted data.
In this way we aim at exhibiting the non-intrusive inte-
gration of our framework in different kind of applications,
by showing at the same time the normally hidden activities
that are necessary to ensure the user’s privacy in different
deployment scenarios.
V. CONCLUSION
We developed a prototype of the privacy-preserving frame-
work for the protection of sensitive positions in real time
trajectories that we proposed in [3]. In this demo we have
shown the suitability of our proposal for different classes of
devices and deployment scenarios as well as the possibility
of integration of the proposed approach in different kind of
location based applications. From a user’s point of view, the
framework allows for an increase of the privacy awareness,
without disrupting the user experience.
Further details on the prototype are available on the SAWL-
net web site (http://www.silv.eu/SAWLnet).
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